Bank Capitalization as a Signal

Working Paper No. 12/114

The level of a bank's capitalization can effectively transmit information about its riskiness and therefore support market discipline, but asymmetry information may induce exaggerated or distortionary behavior: banks may vie with one another to signal confidence in their prospects by keeping capitalization low, and banks' creditors often cannot distinguish among them - tendencies that can be seen across banks and across time. Prudential policy is warranted to help offset these tendencies.
Publication date: May 2012
ISBN: 9781475503357
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Topics covered in this book

This title contains information about the following subjects. Click on a subject if you would like to see other titles with the same subjects.

Economics- Macroeconomics , Economics / General , International - Economics , Bank Capitalization , Pro-cyclicality , Signaling Games , Banks , Economic Models

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