Deposit Insurance and Crisis Management

A well-designed deposit insurance system (DIS) will provide incentives for citizens to keep the financial system sound. However, a poorly designed DIS can foster a financial crisis. This paper, therefore, makes recommendations for creating and running a limited, incentive-compatible, DIS. The paper also examines factors in the decision to grant, temporarily, a comprehensive guarantee, and the design of that guarantee, should a systemic financial crisis nevertheless occur. It concludes with guidance on the removal of that guarantee.
Publication date: March 2000
ISBN: 9781451847765
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Banks and Banking , Banks and Banking , Finance , Finance , comprehensive guarantee , banking , banking system , subordinated debt , systemic crisis

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