Injury Investigations in anti-Dumping and the Super-Additivity Effect : A Theoretical Explanation

Empirical evidence shows that injury investigations in anti-dumping cases conducted by the United States International Trade Commission, the probability of a positive finding is higher when the number of defendant firms is larger, holding constant their total market share. In this paper we offer a theoretical explanation of this finding. We show that the presence of many exporters exacerbates the free-rider problem, which leads every firm to invest less on defense. Thus for the same market share, injury finding is more likely to be positive for many small sellers than a few large sellers.
Publication date: August 2001
ISBN: 9781451853346
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International - Economics , International - Economics , Anti-dumping , cumulation , injury investigation , probability , free-rider problem , international trade , equation , domestic market , Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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