Trade-offs in Bank Resolution

This SDN revisits the debate on bank resolution regimes, first by presenting a simple model of bank insolvency that transparently describes the trade-off involved between bail-outs, bail-ins, and larger capital buffers. The note then looks for empirical evidence to assess the moral hazard consequences of bail-outs and the systemic spillovers from bail-ins.
Publication date: February 2018
ISBN: 9781484341001
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bank insolvency , bail-outs , bail-ins , larger capital buffers , Bank resolution , Financial regulation

Summary